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NOTE

Regulating Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer
Under the General Duty Clause
Drew Levinson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 2013, an explosion at an ammonium nitrate fertilizer
facility in West, Texas killed 14 people and injured hundreds of
others.1 The blast devastated the small community, destroying
“nearly 200 homes, three nearby schools, a nursing home, and an
apartment complex”.2
Videos of the explosion went viral,
showcasing the huge fireball and powerful explosion that
registered 2.1 on the Richter scale.3 The explosion at the West
Fertilizer Company joins a growing list of similar accidents. In
2001, 30 people were killed, 2500 injured, and 10,000 buildings
were heavily damaged in an explosion at an ammonium nitrate
facility in Toulouse, France.4 In 1994, an explosion killed four
* Pace University School of Law J.D. & Environmental Law Certificate
Candidate, 2016; Bachelors of Arts degree in Environmental Studies and a
minor in Management and Business from Skidmore College, 2012. The author
would like to thank the Pace Environmental Law Review editors and associates
for their work on this note.
1. U.S. GAO, GAO-14-274, CHEMICAL SAFETY: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FACILITIES WITH AMMONIUM NITRATE 1 (2014),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-274
[http://perma.cc/28LX-494Y]
[hereinafter CHEMICAL SAFETY].
2. Id.
3. Ann Zimmerman et al., A Grim Day for a Small Town, WALL STREET. J.,
(Apr. 18, 2013, 10:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
4493704578429943017835664 [http://perma.cc/BB5E-3SB3].
4. U.S. EPA, EPA-550-F-15-001, CHEMICAL ADVISORY: SAFE STORAGE,
HANDLING, AND MANAGEMENT OF SOLID AMMONIUM NITRATE PRILLS 3 (2015),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/an_advisory_6-515.pdf [http://perma.cc/N9V5-QY6K] [hereinafter CHEMICAL ADVISORY].

53

1

LEVINSON - POSTMACRO

54

12/16/2015 12:40 PM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

workers and injured eighteen people at an ammonium nitrate
factory in Port Neal, Iowa.5 Despite these horrific accidents, only
modest revisions have been made to federal ammonium nitrate
regulations since 1971.6 Even with growing public support for
increased safety regulations at ammonium nitrate fertilizer
facilities, it is unlikely any federal action will result in today’s
difficult legislative environment. However, the statutory
authority to regulate these facilities may already be in place. This
Article explores how the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) general duty
clause can be utilized to prevent catastrophes such as the
explosion in West, Texas.7
Part II of this Article describes the dangers associated with
ammonium nitrate. More specifically, it looks at prior accidents to
understand the magnitude of these unanticipated explosions.
Part III looks at our current approach to regulating ammonium
nitrate fertilizer and the shortcomings of this regulatory regime.
Part IV provides an overview of the CAA’s general duty clause.
Furthermore, it describes how the general duty clause can be
applied to ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities and the
corresponding obligations imposed upon these facilities.
II.

DANGERS OF AMMONIUM NITRATE

Ammonium nitrate is a chemical compound consisting of
ammonia, salt, and nitric acid, which can be produced in a solid,
liquid, or gas form.8 The substance is widely used in fertilizer, as
well as in explosives.9 As a fertilizer, ammonium nitrate provides
an inexpensive source of nitrogen for plants, which increases
growth and crop yields.
Generally, ammonium nitrate is
considered to be a safe and stable substance.10 However, the
combination of confined storage space and high temperatures can

5. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 6.
6. See id. at 23.
7. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 16.
8. See Fertilizer Product Fact Sheet: Ammonium Nitrate, FERTILIZER INST.,
https://www.tfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/t702-032812-3-c7_12-1313_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/66X2-W863].
9. CHEM. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION OFFICE, U.S. EPA, EPA
550-F-97-002d, CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT: EXPLOSION HAZARD FROM AMMONIUM
NITRATE 1 (1997) [hereinafter CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT].
10. Id.
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transform ammonium nitrate into an explosive substance due to
rapid or thermal decomposition.11
At a temperature of 337 degrees Fahrenheit, ammonium
nitrate begins to melt and undergo decomposition.12 Thermal
decomposition creates toxic gasses containing ammonia, nitric
acid, and nitrogen oxides.13 Confined storage spaces can cause
these gasses to accumulate, increasing pressure to dangerous
levels.14 Unable to dissipate, the heat and pressure produced by
thermal decomposition can result in an unanticipated release of
gaseous byproducts and the detonation of ammonium nitrate.15
As temperatures increase through this process, decomposition
rates continue to rise, creating a spiraling effect.16 In addition to
temperature, the rate of decomposition of ammonium nitrate is
affected by the concentrations of nitric acid, water, and
ammonia.17 Elevated levels of nitric acid increase ammonium
nitrate decomposition, while high concentrations of water and
ammonia inhibit decomposition.18 When temperatures exceed
500 degrees Fahrenheit, ammonium nitrate decomposition is
overtaken by a homolytic mechanism.19 Homolytic decomposition
causes ammonium nitrate to dissociate into two fragments,
releasing nitric acid gas and additional heat.20 The rapid
production of nitric acid significantly lowers pH levels,
destabilizing ammonium nitrate and further increasing
decomposition rates.21 When ammonium nitrate is stored in
large quantities, localized areas of homolytic decomposition or

11. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 4–5.
12. Id. at 4.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 5.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Willis A. Rosser et al., The Kinetics of Decomposition of Liquid
Ammonium Nitrate, 67 J. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 1753, 1754 (1962).
18. See id. at 1754–55.
19. See K.R. Brower et al., Evidence for Homolytic Decomposition of
Ammonium Nitrate at High Temperature, 93 J. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 4029, 4033
(1989).
20. See id. at 4029. Homolytic fission is a form of decomposition where a
molecule dissociates into two neutral fragments. Homolysis, COLLINS ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012).
21. Rosser et al., supra note 17, at 1755.
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high temperatures may be sufficiently confined by the total
quantity to initiate an explosion.22
Furthermore, detonations of ammonium nitrate-based
products are more likely to occur under certain conditions,
including “confinement or self-confinement (when stored in
relatively large quantities), contamination (presence of
impurities) and thermal source (fire or explosion for example).”23
Contamination is particularly dangerous.24 For example, the
presence of carbon black—a highly combustible organic
material—in a storage container can increase the decomposition
rate of ammonium nitrate by more than seven orders of
magnitude.25 “The density, particle size and concentration of
solid [ammonium nitrate] in a material, as well as the presence of
other additives,” all affect the hazardous state of this
compound.26 To truly understand the dangerous potential of
ammonium nitrate, one need only look at the history of
ammonium nitrate production and the catastrophic failures that
have occurred at these facilities in the past.
A. S.S. Grandcamp, Texas City, Texas
On April 16, 1947, approximately 2300 tons of ammonium
nitrate detonated on board the S.S. Grandcamp after the vessel
caught fire while docked in the Port of Texas City.27 The initial
blast triggered a chain reaction of further fires and explosions
that leveled Texas City, killing 581 people and injuring more than
22. CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT, supra note 9, at 2; see CHEMICAL ADVISORY,
supra note 4, at 5.
23. Nicolas Dechy et al., First Lessons of the Toulouse Ammonium Nitrate
Disaster, 21st September 2001, AZF Plant, France, 111 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
131, 134 (2004).
24. Id. (“Dangerous reactions may occur between [ammonium nitrate] and
products such [as]: halogenated (specially chlorinated) compounds;
combustible/organic materials; [and] divided metals, specially in contact with
molten [ammonium nitrate].”).
25. See B.A. Lurie & Chang Lianshen, Kinetics and Mechanism of Thermal
Decomposition of Ammonium Nitrate Powder under the Action of Carbon Black,
in 36 COMBUSTION, EXPLOSION, & SHOCK WAVES 607, 607 (2000).
26. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 5.
27. See generally FIRE PREVENTION & ENG’G BUREAU OF TEX. & THE NAT’L
BD. OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS, TEXAS CITY, TEXAS, DISASTER (1947),
http://www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm
[http://perma.cc/7EVH-Q7LN]
[hereinafter TEXAS CITY ACCIDENT REPORT].
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3500 others.28 In all, the accident resulted in property damage of
roughly $100 million, or $1.06 billion in today’s terms.29
B. Terra Fertilizer Plant, Port Neal, Iowa
On December 13, 1994, two massive explosions leveled
portions of the Terra ammonium nitrate production facility in
Port Neal, Iowa. The blast killed four plant workers and seriously
injured eighteen others.30 The accident resulted in the release of
approximately 5700 tons of anhydrous ammonia into the air and
approximately 25,000 gallons of nitric acid into the soil.31 Offsite
discharges continued for approximately six days following the
explosion, resulting in significant contamination of the
groundwater under the facility.32 Estimates of the damage
caused by the accident are “in the hundreds of millions of
dollars.”33
Investigations revealed unsafe plant operations and poor
maintenance procedures were the cause of the explosion.34 Terra
had never completed a process hazard analysis of its ammonium
nitrate production, nor did it have formal safe-operation
procedures.35
Moreover, many of Terra’s employees were
unaware of the hazards of ammonium nitrate36 and therefore
unable to safely respond to an emergency situation. These factors

28. This Day in History: Fertilizer Explosion Kills 581 in Texas,
HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fertilizer-explosionkills-581-in-texas [http://perma.cc/ZJR3-5ETC].
29. Id.
30. Explosion of the Terra Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Port, Neal, Iowa, 1 J.
FAILURE
ANALYSIS
&
PREVENTION
22,
22–25
(2001),
http://
products.asminternational.org/fach/data/fullDisplay.do?database=faco&record=1
898&trim=false [http://perma.cc/7XBA-JF97] [hereinafter Explosion of Terra
Plant].
31. REGION 7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE & REMOVAL BRANCH, U.S. EPA,
CHEMICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES, INC. NITROGEN
FERTILIZER FACILITY PORT NEAL, IOWA 1 (1996) [hereinafter CHEMICAL ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES].
32. Id.
33. Explosion of Terra Plant, supra note 30, at 22.
34. CHEMICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES, supra
note 31, at 94.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 2.
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resulted in conditions necessary for ammonium nitrate to
detonate.37
C. AZF Facility, Toulouse, France
In September 2001, an explosion at the Azote de France
(“AZF”) ammonium nitrate fertilizer facility in Toulouse, France
killed thirty-one people and injured thousands others.38 The
explosion created a crater roughly 200 feet in diameter and
twenty-three feet deep.39 The detonation could be felt fifty miles
away, and shattered every window within two miles of the
factory.40 More than 11,000 homes were seriously damaged, and
seventy schools were closed as a result of the blast.41 Property
damage from the explosion exceeded three billion dollars.42
Furthermore, acid clouds spewed into the air, hospitalizing
approximately 800 people with burns or internal injuries.43
Nearby towns and villages were unable to drink tap water for
several days because the plant had contaminated the nearby
Garonne River.44
The AZF factory, one of France’s largest petrochemical
plants, stored roughly 30,000 tons of ammonium nitrate at the

37. See id. at 2.
38. Carol Matlack, Texas Fertilizer Explosion Recalls French Disaster,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/201304-18/texas-fertilizer-explosion-recalls-french-disaster
[http://perma.cc/VL65JJEK].
39. FRANÇOIS BARTHELEMY ET AL., REPORT OF THE GENERAL INSPECORATE FOR
THE ENVIORNMENT: ACCIDENT ON THE 21ST OF SEPTEMBER 2001 AT A FACTORY
BELONGING TO THE GRANDE PAROISSE COMPANY IN TOULOUSE 6 (2001).
40. See id. at 7; AZF Plant Explosion, SOS CATASTROPHES, http://www.soscatastrophes.eu/AZF-plant-explosion-76 [http://perma.cc/5L3E-MJP4].
41. Luis Bravo de la Iglesia, Conclusions Drawn from the Toulouse
Accident: Application to Loss Estimation for Explosions, TREBOL , at 6, http://
www.mapfre.com/ccm/content/documentos/mapfrere/fichero/en/trebol-en-num232.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UZD-2Y6Z].
42. Carol Matlack, Texas Fertilizer Explosion Recalls French Disaster,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/201304-18/texas-fertilizer-explosion-recalls-french-disaster
[http://perma.cc/VL65JJEK].
43. Marlise Simons, French Search for Cause of Chemical Plant Explosion,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/world/frenchsearch-for-cause-of-chemical-plant-explosion.html, [http://perma.cc/3HP4-YJ4R].
44. Id.
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site.45 The explosion occurred in a storage tank used to stow
downgraded ammonium nitrate before it was recycled.46 At the
time of the explosion, the tank contained 300 tons of ammonium
nitrate, although experts estimate only forty to eighty metric tons
actually detonated.47 While the root cause of the explosion
remains unknown,48 many believe ammonium nitrate
contamination is likely the cause of the Toulouse accident.49
Regardless of the specific cause, the accident could have been
mitigated, if not avoided altogether, with better safety equipment
and procedures. However, “the risk of an explosion was not
considered important by the site’s security.”50 The facility was
not fitted with a fire detection system, nor did it have any
nitrogen oxide detectors.51 The presence of either “would help to
reduce the time taken to raise the alarm and consequently the
time taken to put any fires out.”52 Additionally, the facility’s
infrastructure was in poor condition and largely unmonitored.53
The few monitoring systems in place were run by sub-contractors,
creating a greater disconnect in communication between
employees and decision makers.54 European lawmakers reacted
strongly, amending previous legislation to include lessons learned
from the AZF disaster.55

45. BARTHELEMY ET AL., supra note 39, at 3.
46. Id. at 5. “The ‘downgraded’ products came principally from the
ammonium nitrate production and packaging workshops for producing
fertili[z]ers or industrial ammonium nitrate; the downgrading could be linked to
irregularities in the particle size and also to the composition of the products.”
Id..
47. Id. at 5–6.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Dechy et al., supra note 23, at 134.
50. Simons, supra note 43 (quoting Michel Bŕeard, Toulouse’s prosecutor).
51. BARTHELEMY ET AL., supra note 39, at 5 (noting devices were present on
other larger storage facilities on the site).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Directive 2003/105/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 December 2003 Amending Council Directive 96/82/EC on the
Control of Major-accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, 2003 O.J.
(L 345) 1, 1 (EU), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32003L0105&from=EN [http://perma.cc/9ENA-SHDH].
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D. West Fertilizer Facility, West, Texas
On the evening of April 17, 2013, a wooden warehouse caught
fire at the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas.56 Firefighters
rushed to the site unaware of the explosive potential of the
approximately sixty tons of fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate
stored inside the warehouse.57 Heated by the warehouse fire, the
ammonium nitrate suddenly detonated.58
“A shock wave,
traveling faster than the speed of sound, crushed buildings,
flattened walls, and shattered windows.”59 The explosion killed
twelve emergency responders, and at least two members of the
public.60 More than 200 others were seriously injured from the
blast.61 While the financial damage caused by the accident is still
being assessed, “total damages to the town may exceed $230
million, an unimaginable blow to a town of just 2800 residents—
more than $80,000 for each man, woman, and child living in
West.”62
The explosion at the West Fertilizer facility was preventable
and should have never occurred.63 The facility failed to take
necessary steps to avert a preventable fire, which ultimately
triggered the deadly explosion.64
West Fertilizer kept its
ammonium nitrate in wooden bins, which were stored inside a
wooden warehouse without a sprinkler system.65 These highly
combustible storage conditions directly contributed to the
56. Oversight of Federal Risk Management and Emergency Planning
Programs to Prevent and Address Chemical Threats, Including the Events
Leading Up to the Explosions in West, TX and Geismar, LA: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Statement
of Moure-Eraso] (statement of Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairperson of the United
States Chemical Safety Board).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 2.
63. Manny Fernandez, Lax Oversight Cited as Factor in Deadly Blast at
Texas Plant, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/
23/us/lack-of-oversight-and-regulations-blamed-in-texas-chemicalexplosion.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/F4HN-HVKF] (quoting Rafael MoureEraso, the chairman of the Chemical Safety Board).
64. Id.
65. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 1.
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intensity of the warehouse fire that detonated the ammonium
nitrate fertilizer.66 However, “[n]o federal regulations exist
preventing a company from storing [ammonium nitrate] in such a
way.”67 Furthermore, local planning committees did not have an
emergency response plan in place for the West Fertilizer
facility.68 As a result, the volunteer firefighters responding to the
fire were unaware of the dangerous potential of ammonium
nitrate and, therefore, unable to safely control the fire.69
III.

CURRENT REGULATION OF AMMONIUM
NITRATE

“Ammonium nitrate fertilizer storage falls under a
patchwork of U.S. regulatory standards and guidance—a
patchwork that has many large holes.”70 No single set of U.S.
standards or guidance prohibits or discourages many of the
factors that likely contributed to the disaster in West, Texas.71
For example, “storage of ammonium nitrate in combustible
wooden buildings and bins is permitted across the U.S.—exposing
ammonium nitrate to the threat of fire.”72
Despite these known dangers, OSHA and EPA do not require
fertilizer facilities to report their ammonium nitrate holdings.73
While OSHA has set out some basic requirements for the storage,
use, and transportation of ammonium nitrate,74 neither OSHA
nor EPA list ammonium nitrate as an extremely hazardous
substance.75 Even though EPA has issued official alerts on the
explosive potential of ammonium nitrate,76 neither agency has
revised its regulations for ammonium nitrate facilities since

66. Id. at 4.
67. Fernandez, supra note 63.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 8.
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.109 (2015).
75. See DANA A. SHEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43070, REGULATION
OF FERTILIZERS: AMMONIUM NITRATE AND ANHYDROUS AMMONIA 9–10 (2013).
76. See CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 5; CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT,
supra note 9, at 2.
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1971.77 Presently, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
is the primary regulating body of ammonium nitrate. While DHS
lists ammonium nitrate as hazardous, it only requires certain
chemical facilities to report possession of ammonium nitrate.78
The lack of regulation—combined with the distribution of
limited oversight across so many agencies—are of serious
concern, considering that roughly 7.5 million tons of ammonium
nitrate were produced in the United States in 2010,79 and
853,093 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer were used in 2012.80
While the total number of facilities producing ammonium nitrate
fertilizer in the United States is unknown, “over 1300 facilities
reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS.”81 Regardless of the
exact number, it is clear a significant amount of ammonium
nitrate is maintained in storage facilities throughout the United
States. Discussed in greater detail below are the current
ammonium nitrate safety regulations that OSHA, EPA, and DHS
have promulgated to date.
A. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
OSHA is responsible for setting and enforcing regulations to
protect workers from hazards in the workplace, including
exposure to hazardous chemicals.82 In 1992, OSHA adopted its
Process Safety Management (“PSM”) standard “to prevent
catastrophic workplace incidents involving highly hazardous
chemicals.”83 PSM requires companies to implement a variety of
safety initiatives, “such as conducting hazard analyses and
77. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 23.
78. Id. at 2, 9–10.
79. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT INDUSTRIAL
REPORTS: FERTILIZERS AND RELATED CHEMICALS (2010).
80. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 1–2.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (“To assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and
women by authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by
assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and healthful
working conditions; by providing for research, information, education, and
training in the field of occupational safety and health; and for other purposes.”).
83. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.119 (2015).
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developing emergency plans,” to prevent catastrophic incidents.84
However, ammonium nitrate facilities are not subject to
regulation under PSM, as OSHA has not listed ammonium
nitrate as a highly hazardous chemical subject to PSM
requirements.85 The PSM standard also contains an exemption
for retail facilities, which would exempt most ammonium nitrate
fertilizer facilities from regulation.86
“OSHA considered adding ammonium nitrate along with
other highly reactive chemicals to its list of PSM-covered
substances in the late 1990s.”87 This proposal was shelved in
2001, but new discussions of modifying PSM regulations to
include ammonium nitrate have precipitated following the West,
Texas disaster.88
B. Environmental Protection Agency
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Amendments of 1990,
EPA’s Risk Management Program (“RMP”) requires facilities
handling particular chemicals to plan how to prevent and
mitigate chemical accidents.89 EPA’s RMP rule was adopted in
1996 to prevent catastrophic offsite environmental damage from
accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances.90 The
Program “requires covered facilities to develop a Risk
Management Plan, implement various safety programs, and
analyze offsite consequences from potential accidents.”91 RMP

84. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5.
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 app. A.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(a)(ii)(B)(2)(i).
87. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 6.
88. In response to Executive Order 13650, OSHA requests comment on
potential revisions to its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and
potential changes to PSM enforcement policies. See Process Safety Management
and Prevention of Major Chemical Accidents, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,756 (proposed Dec.
9, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
89. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 10; see Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 301, 304, 104 Stat. 2399, 2563–74, 2576–77
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)–(s) (1994)); see also CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note
1, at 8.
90. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5. See generally Chemical
Accident Prevention Provisions, 40 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2015).
91. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5; see SHEA ET AL., supra
note 75, at 10 (“RMPs summarize the potential threat of an unanticipated
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requirements apply to facilities the EPA Administrator
determines “pose the greatest risk of causing death, injury, or
serious adverse effects to human health or the environment from
accidental releases.”92 In listing substances, the Administrator
considers “the severity of any acute adverse health effects
associated with accidental releases of the substance,” “the
likelihood of accidental releases of the substance,” and “the
potential magnitude of human exposure to accidental releases of
the substance.”93 Any facility storing a listed chemical above
threshold quantities must “take specific steps to prevent and
prepare for chemical accidents.”94 However, ammonium nitrate
is not a listed chemical and therefore not subject to RMP
requirements.95
Additionally, the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (“EPCRA”) established authorities for
emergency planning and preparedness and emergency release
notification reporting, among other things.96 Under Section 312
of EPCRA, facilities with certain hazardous chemicals in amounts
at or above threshold levels—including ammonium nitrate in
some circumstances—are required to submit annual chemical
inventory forms to state and local authorities to help emergency
response officials prepare for and respond to chemical incidents.97
Ammonium nitrate is also regulated under Section 311 of
EPRCA.98 Section 311 requires owners or operators of local
facilities covered by the OSHA to submit a Material Safety Data
Sheet (“MSDS”) for each “hazardous chemical” stored at the
facility.99 The MDMS reports are then given to the applicable
State Emergency Response Commissions (“SERCs”), Local
Emergency Planning Committees (“LEPCs”), and local fire
emissions into the ambient air of certain dangerous chemicals and facilities’
plans to prevent such releases and mitigate any damage.”).
92. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 10.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(4)(A) (2012).
94. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 8.
95. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 (2015) (listing substances regulated under
RMP).
96. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728–58 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001–11050 (1988)).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(1).
98. Id. § 11021.
99. Id. § 11021(a)(1).
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department, to develop and implement local plans for coping with
potential releases of hazardous chemicals.100 However, EPRCA
Section 311 excludes “fertilizer held for sale by a retailer to the
ultimate customer” from regulation as a “hazardous chemical.”101
C. Department of Homeland Security
The DHS is required to “regulate the sale and transfer of
ammonium nitrate by an ammonium nitrate facility. . .to prevent
the misappropriation or use of ammonium nitrate in an act of
For purposes of enhancing chemical facility
terrorism.”102
security, DHS adopted the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (“CFATS”) program, which requires facilities
possessing certain chemicals at or above threshold quantities—
including some types of ammonium nitrate—to submit reports to
DHS with information about the facility and the regulated
chemicals present on site.103 Based on the degree of risk posed by
each facility, DHS determines which chemicals and facilities
must meet regulatory security requirements.104
DHS lists
“chemicals of interest and the screening threshold quantities for
each” chemical required to comply with CFATS.105
In
determining chemicals of interest, DHS considers each chemical
in the context of three threats: release, theft or diversion, and
sabotage or contamination.106 Ammonium nitrate is a chemical of
interest, classified as posing a threat of theft and release.107
However, this requirement does not apply to all facilities
with ammonium nitrate.108 Only facilities storing ammonium
100. Id. § 11021(a)(1)(A)−(C).
101. Id. § 11021(e)(5).
102. 6 U.S.C. § 488a(a).
103. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 27 (2015). DHS issued the CFATS regulations in 2007
and the list initially included 322 chemicals of interest and the screening
threshold quantities for each chemical. See id. app. A.
104. Id.
105. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Improve Its Risk
Assessments and Outreach for Chemical Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Cybersecurity Infrastructure Prot. & Sec. Techs. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director
of Homeland Security and Justice).
106. 6 C.F.R. § 27.203.
107. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 10 tbl.1.
108. Id. at 10.
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nitrate in threshold quantities are required to report.109 Certain
agricultural producers are also exempt from DHS’s reporting
requirements.110 Furthermore, DHS’s reporting requirement
applies only to ammonium nitrate stored “in transportable
containers such as cylinders, bulk bags, bottles (inside or outside
of boxes),” or tanks.111
Following the explosion at the West Fertilizer Company
facility, policymakers expressed concern over the lack of oversight
and requested information about the regulation of agricultural
fertilizers.112 On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed
Executive Order 13,650, which directed government agencies
with regulatory authority to take additional measures to further
improve chemical facility safety and reduce security risks
associated with hazardous chemicals.113 Multiple government
agencies have also attempted to educate the public on the
potential dangers associated with ammonium nitrate storage. In
2013, EPA, in conjunction with OSHA and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, issued a chemical advisory for
the safe storage, handling, and management of ammonium
nitrate.114 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
also recently released a report stating that without improved
monitoring of facilities that store ammonium nitrate and
coordination between U.S. agencies, federal regulators “will not
know the extent to which dangerous conditions at some facilities
may continue to exist.”115 Accidents like the explosion at the
West Fertilizer facility are due to management’s failure to take
the necessary steps to avert a preventable fire and explosion, and
from the inability of federal, state, and local regulatory agencies
to identify serious hazards and correct them.116 The GAO report
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. “Pursuant to its authority under 6 C.F.R. § 27.210(c), DHS has
extended the deadline for submitting CFATS reports until further notice for
certain agricultural production facilities, such as farms, ranches, turfgrass
growers, golf courses, nurseries, and public and private parks.” Id. at 10 n.24;
see Notice to Agricultural Facilities About Requirement To Complete DHS’
Chemical Security Assessment Tool, 73 Fed. Reg. 1640 (Jan. 9, 2008).
111. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 10; see 6 C.F.R. § 27.203(c).
112. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 1.
113. Exec. Order No. 13,650, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,029 (Aug. 1, 2013).
114. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 2.
115. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 45.
116. Id.
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highlights the fact that while agencies have taken steps to
address the issue, they have not solved the problem. However, the
CAA’s general duty clause provides EPA the explicit authority to
impose the necessary safety protocols to prevent these
catastrophic accidents.
IV.

GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE

In 1984, a chemical facility’s accidental and sudden release of
methyl isocyanate killed and injured thousands of people in
Bhopal, India.117 Shortly thereafter, a similar toxic spill took
place in Institute, West Virginia that sent hundreds to the
hospital.118 The accident in West Virginia raised significant
questions about the possibility of other such accidents occurring
in the U.S.119 In response to public concern over the potential
release of hazardous substances, Congress passed the CAA
Amendments of 1990, which established the Accidental Release
Prevention Program.120 Specifically, Section 112(r)(1) established
a “general duty” to prevent the accidental release of extremely
hazardous substances.
Section 112(r)(1) is an important part of the federal chemical
accidental release prevention program and is more commonly
referred to as the general duty clause. Under this clause, the
owners and operators of facilities producing, processing,
handling, or storing any extremely hazardous substances have a
general duty to prevent an accidental release and to minimize the
consequences of any such release.121 The definition of an
“extremely hazardous substance” is very broad. Legislative
history indicates the statute was intended to include substances
“which may or may not be listed or otherwise identified by any
Government agency which may as the result of short-term
117. CHEM. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION OFFICE, U.S. EPA,
EPA-550-B00-002, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL DUTY
CLAUSE CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 112(r)(1) 2 (2000) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION
OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE]; Van R. Delhotal, The General Duty to Prevent
Accidental Releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances: The General Duty
Clause of Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 61, 64 (1993).
118. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 2.
119. Id.
120. See Delhotal, supra note 117, at 77.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (2012).
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exposures associated with releases to the air cause death, injury
or property damage due to its toxicity, reactivity, flammability,
volatility, or corrosivity.”122 This does not, however, include
public health impacts resulting from “chronic” exposures to
releases over a long period of time.123 Rather, “an accidental
release is one which causes or may cause immediate (or near
term) death, serious injury, or substantial property damage as a
result of exposure to an extremely hazardous substance.”124
Section 112(r)(1) opened a new and potentially broad scheme to
assure facilities are operated safely.
Owners and operators have three primary obligations under
the general duty clause: (1) to “identify hazards which may result
from accidental releases using appropriate hazard assessment
techniques,” (2) to “design and maintain a safe facility taking
such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and” (3) to
“minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do
occur.”125 Although each of these obligations requires owners and
operators to undertake a series of measures, the general duty
clause does not specifically prescribe these measures.126 To
determine owner and operator obligations under the general duty
clause, EPA will look to the hazards and standards identified by
the facility or industry.127 If such standards or practices do not
exist, “owners or operators are responsible for identifying hazards
and taking appropriate measures to prevent releases and
minimize the consequences of a release.”128 Accordingly, owners
and operators must conduct a hazard assessment to determine if
the facility’s design, maintenance practices, operation procedures,
and mitigation measures meet or exceed any applicable industry
practices or standards or state or federal regulations.129 When
developing the general duty clause, the Senate Committee
identified eleven elements that could be generically applicable to
122. S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3596.
123. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 10 n.2.
(citing S. REP. NO. 101-228).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 11.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 12.
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EPA accident prevention regulations: (1) hazard evaluation (that
is, hazard assessment), (2) maintenance of safety documentation,
(3) regular safety reviews, (4) operating procedures, (5) operator
training, (6) preventative maintenance, (7) release prevention
measures, (8) release detection systems, (9) upset and accident
release investigations, (10) alert systems and emergency response
plans, and (11) program audits.130 While the Senate Committee
acknowledged that this list was not comprehensive, it provides a
useful outline for addressing non-formal hazard assessment
problems.131
For enforcement purposes, EPA looks to OSHA’s general duty
clause for clarity. CAA Section 112(r)(1) specifically states that
the general duty clause applies “in the same manner and to the
same extent as [OHSA’s general duty clause,] section 654, title 29
[of the United States Code].”132
Previous litigation and administrative hearings on OHSA’s
general duty clause have formed the essential elements for a
cause of action.133
Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission v. Duriron Co. held that an agency must prove four
things in order to establish a general duty clause violation:
(1) [t]he employer failed to render its workplace free of a
hazard, (2) the hazard was recognized either by the cited
employer or generally within the employer’s industry, (3) the
hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or serious
physical harm, and (4) there was a feasible means by which the
employer could have eliminated or materially reduced the
hazard.134
Accordingly, “[t]o constitute a recognized hazard” within the
meaning of the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), “the dangerous potential of
a condition or activity must actually be known either to the
particular employer or generally in the industry.”135

130.
3624–27.
131.
132.
133.
n.4.
134.
135.

S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
Id. at 3627.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (2012).
See IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 11
Delhotal, supra note 117, at 99–100.
Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
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A. Legal Interpretation
While the definition of a hazard within the scope of OSHA’s
general duty clause is supported by legal precedence, the question
of what constitutes a foreseeable hazard within the bounds of
EPA’s enforcement authority is one of first impression. No
previous litigation, administrative decisions, or EPA guidelines
have been issued as to the limits of the general duty clause’s
applicability. Moreover, the amendment’s legislative history
provides negligible insight into the extent a chemical substance
may be classified as “extremely hazardous,” subject to the
obligations of Section 112(r)(1). However, common law and public
nuisance jurisprudence provide some perspective on how to apply
the general duty clause.
The CAA’s general duty clause codified the common law duty
to prevent public nuisance, defined as “the doing of or the failure
to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or
morals of the public.”136 Furthermore, a public nuisance “may be
enjoined because harm is threatened that would be significant if
it occurred, and that would make the nuisance actionable . . .
although no harm has yet resulted.”137 Accordingly, where
irreparable injury is threatened, a court may act by injunction to
prevent the harm before it occurs.138 Such interferences with
public safety include the storage of potentially explosive
material.139 Regardless of the likelihood of an interference
occurring, it is a facility’s common law duty to guard against the
threat of irreparable injury.140 This principle underscores the
very purpose of the CAA’s general duty clause, and appropriately
justifies the application of such duty to facilities producing,
storing, and transporting ammonium nitrate fertilizer.

136. Commonwealth v. S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W.
581, 583 (Ky. 1918).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
138. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 165 n.8 (5th ed.
1984).
139. See State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 169 S.W. 267, 273 (Mo. 1914).
140. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 138.
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B. Application to Ammonium Nitrate Facilities
To establish a cause of action under Section 112(r)(1), the
agency must demonstrate that: (1) the facility is a stationary
source, (2) the substance is extremely hazardous, and (3) there is
the potential for an accidental release.141 For purposes of the
federal chemical accidental release prevention program, a
“stationary source” means any buildings, structures, equipment,
installations, or substance emitting stationary activities from
which an accidental release may occur.142 Accordingly, any
facility producing, processing, handling, or storing ammonium
nitrate fertilizer constitutes a stationary source within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C). However, deciphering what
an extremely hazardous substance and accidental release
actually are, within the context of Section 112(r), is a bit more
complex.
As discussed above, the definition of an “extremely hazardous
substance” is very broad. Section 112(r)(1) states that the general
duty applies to “any substance listed pursuant to paragraph (3)
[EPA’s list of substances known to be extremely hazardous] or
any other extremely hazardous substance.”143
Although
ammonium nitrate is not a listed substance, legislative history
indicates the statute includes substances “which may as the
result of short-term exposures associated with releases to the air
cause death, injury or property damage due to their toxicity,
reactivity, flammability, volatility, or corrosivity.”144 Under
certain circumstances, ammonium nitrate may be considered
extremely hazardous.145
Ammonium nitrate melts at a
temperature of 337 degrees Fahrenheit and starts thermal
decomposition.146 Although unusual, ammonium nitrate has a
reactive and volatile potential to explode when thermal
decomposition occurs in “a confined space and the heat and gases

11.

141. See IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 10–

142.
143.
144.
3596.
145.
146.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C) (2012).
Id. § 7412(r)(1).
S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 16.
Id. at 4.
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created are not able to dissipate.”147
Conditions such as
“confinement or self-confinement (when stored in relatively large
quantities), contamination (presence of impurities) and [a]
thermal source (fire or explosion for example)” increase the
likelihood of the release of extremely hazardous substances
resulting in a catastrophic event.148 The events of West, Texas;
Toulouse, France; and Port Neal, Iowa demonstrate that
accidental explosions of ammonium nitrate do occur, and, when
they do, they have a high impact on the surrounding area,
resulting in the loss of life and destruction of property. Thus,
ammonium nitrate, under the appropriate conditions, is an
extremely hazardous substance within the general duty clause’s
broad scheme to assure facilities are operated safely.
The general duty clause also requires that the release of an
extremely hazardous substance be accidental. For purposes of the
federal chemical accidental release prevention program, “[t]he
term ‘accidental release’ means an unanticipated emission of a
regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into
the ambient air from a stationary source.”149 As previously
discussed, thermal decomposition of ammonium nitrate creates
toxic gases containing ammonia, nitrogen oxides, and nitric
acid.150 Confined storage spaces can cause these gasses to
accumulate, increasing pressure to dangerous levels.151 Unable
to dissipate, the heat and pressure produced by thermal
decomposition can result in an unanticipated release of gaseous
byproducts and the detonation of ammonium nitrate.152
Accordingly, the release of any quantity of ammonium nitrate,
any byproducts of ammonium nitrate decomposition, and the
chemicals resulting from the explosion of ammonium nitrate into
the ambient air constitutes an “accidental release,” as defined by
42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A).

134.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 4–5.
Dechy et al., supra note 23, at 134.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A) (2012).
CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 4; Dechy et al., supra note 23, at

151. Id. at 5.
152. See id.
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C. Duties Imposed on Ammonium Nitrate Facilities
Should the general duty clause apply, the owners and
operators of ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities have an
obligation to: “identify hazards which may result from accidental
releases,” “design and maintain a safe facility,” and “minimize the
consequences of accidental releases which do occur.”153 Owners
and operators must then conduct hazard assessments to ensure
the facility’s design, maintenance, operation, and mitigation
measures meet or exceed any applicable industry practices or
standards.154 Therefore, ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities
must look to specific safety and handling instructions established
by organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA),155 Compressed Gas Association (CGA),156 ResponsibleAg
(RA)157 and the National Safety Council (NSC).158
These directives include procedures to: avoid heating
ammonium nitrate in a confined space (e.g., processes involving

153. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 11.
154. Id. at 15.
155. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 23 n.45 (“NFPA is an independent
nonprofit organization that convenes technical committees to develop national
codes and standards intended to minimize the possibility and effects of fire and
other risks.”); see NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 400: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
CODE ch. 11 (2013) [hereinafter NFPA 400] (setting forth specific safety
procedures including building design, storage in bags, storage in bulk, and fire
protection).
156. “The Compressed Gas Association (“CGA”) is an organization
dedicated to the development and promotion of safety standards and safe
practices in the industrial gas industry.”
About Us, COMPRESSED GAS ASS’N, http://www.cganet.com/about.php
[http://perma.cc/F4H6-W9A2].
157. Agricultural Retailers Association (“ARA”) is a “non-profit trade
association that represents the interests of agricultural retailers and
distributors across the United States on legislative and regulatory issues. As the
political voice for agricultural retailers and distributors, ARA advocates on
critical issues, educates legislators and collaborates with regulatory officials on
important issues affecting the industry.” Who We Are And What We Do, AGRIC.
RETAILERS ASS’N, http://www.aradc.org/aradc/about/about [http://perma.cc/S3FG7A69].
158. “[T]he National Safety Council is a nonprofit organization with the
mission to save lives by preventing injuries and deaths at work, in homes and
communities, and on the road through leadership, research, education and
advocacy.” About the National Safety Council, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL,
http://www.nsc.org/learn/about/Pages/about-nsc.aspx
[http://perma.cc/96PRSJSN].
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ammonium nitrate should be designed to avoid this
possibility);159 avoid localized heating of ammonium nitrate,
potentially leading to development of high temperature areas;160
avoid contamination of ammonium nitrate with combustible
materials or organic substances such as oils and waxes;161
“[m]aintain the pH of [ammonium nitrate] solutions within a safe
operating range of the process”;162 and implement appropriate
fire prevention and accident mitigation methods.163 Under the
general duty clause, these guidelines become legal obligations for
the owners and operators of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
facilities. Failure to abide by industry practices or standards
could result in significant fines against owners and operators not
in compliance, thus, providing a strong incentive for all
ammonium nitrate facilities to implement measures to prevent
releases and minimize the consequences of an accident.
V.
to

CONCLUSION

“No other single chemical has caused more widespread harm
the public in preventable accidents than ammonium

159. FERTILIZER INST., SAFETY AND SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE
AND TRANSPORTATION OF FERTILIZER GRADE AMMONIUM NITRATE AT FERTILIZER
RETAIL FACILITIES 8 (2014) (“Bins should have appropriate ventilation and be

constructed to self-ventilate in the event of a fire to avoid pressurization. . . .
Bulk piles should not exceed 40 feet in height. Piles should be no higher than 36
inches below roof. Piles should not contact supporting beams or other related
supporting structures.”).
160. NFPA 400, supra note 155, at §§ 11.3.2.2.3, 11.3.2.2.5.
161. FERTILIZER INST., supra note 159, at 4–5 (“Avoid contamination of
[fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate] with combustible materials or organic
substances including, but not limited to: (i) organic chemicals, acids, or other
corrosive materials; (ii) compressed flammable gases; (iii) flammable and
combustible materials, solids or liquids; and, (iv) other contaminating
substances such as wood chips, organic materials, chlorides, phosphorus, finely
divided metals, charcoals, diesel fuels and oils, sulfur.”); NFPA 400, supra note
155, §§ 11.3.2.3.3.1–11.3.2.3.3.2.
162. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 7.
163. Id. at 8–9 (“[Ammonium nitrate] storage areas should be equipped
with an automatic sprinkler system, or have an automatic fire detection and
alarm system if the areas are not continuously occupied.”); FERTILIZER INST.,
supra note 159, at 7–8 (“[Ammonium nitrate] storage areas should have
automatic fire detection and alarm systems if the areas are not continuously
occupied. . . . Situations where water supplies, rate of flow, and fire hydrants are
not available should be accounted for in the emergency response plan.”).
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nitrate.”164 The CAA’s general duty clause offers a legitimate
alternative for regulating the production and storage of
ammonium nitrate. Evidence from the many serious prior
incidents involving ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities clearly
demonstrates the dangerous potential of unanticipated releases of
this extremely hazardous substance. The magnitude of these
incidents illustrates the need to apply the CAA’s general duty
clause, a federal regulation that is already in place and would
adequately govern these dangerous conditions. Accordingly,
facilities producing, processing, handling, or storing ammonium
nitrate should have a duty to prevent an accidental release and to
minimize the consequences of any such release, and should be
regulated as such.

164. Fernandez, supra note 63.
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